**Staff Training on Radicalization and Violent Extremist Inmates**

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**PREFACE:**

Most of the material, research and suggested protocols in this document come from a variety of sources, such as members of the International Corrections and Prisons Association Staff Training and Development Committee (ICPA), members of the International Association of Correctional Training Personnel (IACTP) and prison security personnel from several nations. However, though I tried hard to give credit and cite those organizations, individuals or publications from which material was gathered, it is possible some were missed. For this I offer my apology and as I find the sources of information not credited with this draft, I will include them in updates.

This document will always be a draft in that it is intended not as a final document for agencies to copy and use as is, but rather as a template to be changed and modified as needed due to the cultural, economic, political, legal and social realities of the prison system using it. Other changes may be required to the physical plant of the institution involved. This is not a document for a prison system, but rather for individual institutions. Though many items in this document will apply to all prison facilities, prison staff and prison administrations (such as the references to international human rights standards), much of the material must be modified for the facility using it. This document is prepared in Microsoft Word because it is a much used word processing program and can be easily modified by induvial users.

**THE PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL**

Many jurisdictions have excellent staff training programs while others have virtually no formal training. Some correctional staff training programs spend time on helping line level staff work with prison gangs, convicted members of organized crime, and those convicted of terrorist crimes. Often those programs are used or slightly modified to talk about inmates who are or might become radicalized or who have a background or propensity to exhibit violent behavior based on extremist ideology. Seminars for correctional personnel have been developed to explain how and why individuals become radicalized, but few talk about what individual officers can do to help them work with radicalized or violent extremist inmates. It is the purpose of this manual, with included specific lesson plans, to provide information to help individual officers perform their job when dealing with radicalized and violent extremist inmates in a safe, humane and effective manner. This manual is not a scientific presentation on the causes of radicalization nor a proscriptive piece on how to reduce or eliminate radicalization within society. It is geared only toward correctional personnel with major emphasis on those officers who work directly with the inmate population. Some material is included for middle and top management as well as for policy makers.

The Manual is divided into sections:

1. **General Observations** about radicalization and terrorist actions. This will include definitions and some of what is known about why individuals become radicalized in society outside the prison. Some of those reasons will apply to inmates as well.
2. **Prison Considerations** that can impact positively or negatively on staff working with radical (or potentially radical) and violent extremist inmates. This section contains some information that administrators and policy makers may find useful in policy development. It is also intended to provide a general overview of radicalization and terrorism issues for correctional officers.
3. **Draft Lesson Plan on Working with Radical and Violent Extremist Offenders**
4. **Appendix** includes sample lesson plans, forms and general information that supplement information provided in the core manual as well as additional reading to help officers increase their knowledge of radical and violent extremist inmates.
5. **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS**
   1. **Definitions** (as adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2016)
      1. **Radicalization** represents a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.
      2. **Violent extremism** consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts that may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.
      3. **Dynamic security** is a concept and a working method by which staff prioritize the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within the broader notion of security which also comprises structural, organizational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary).
      4. **United Nations definition** of terrorism does not exist. Although terrorism is a man program area of the United Nations, the nations cannot come up with a common definition because some nations want to exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination.
      5. **Terrorism definition used in this manual** comes from the Library of Congress Federal Research Division:

*Definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually inadequate. Even terrorism researchers often neglect to define the term other than by citing the basic* ***U.S. Department of State (1998) definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”*** *Although an act of violence that is generally regarded in the United States as an act of terrorism may not be viewed so in another country, the type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, such as ordinary crime or a wartime military action, can still be defined in terms that might qualify as reasonably objective.*

*This social sciences research defines a terrorist action as* ***the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.***


* 1. **Definitions** (applied to corrections)
     1. **Terrorism Inmates** (from Radicalization Prevention in Prisons -R2pris- project) are incarcerated persons who, as a result of being radicalized either prior to, or during imprisonment, engage in the following activities: recruitment of other prisoners; supporting extremist groups from prison; getting support from extremist groups outside prison; preparing for violent extremist/ideological inspired illegal acts after release; terrorist ideology-inspired hostility to other groups of prisoners and/or staff; increasing of their radicalization level because of grievances/frustrations/anger related to being in prison.
     2. **Rehabilitation** in this manual is defined as the process where individuals or groups cease their involvement in organized violence and/or terrorism. The process can involve de-radicalization and/or disengagement. While de-radicalization aims for substantive changes in individuals’ ideology and attitudes, disengagement concentrates on facilitating behavioral change.[[1]](#endnote-1) “The disengaged terrorist may not be ‘de-radicalized’ or repent at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support”[[2]](#endnote-2)
     3. **Difference between *ordinary* criminals vs *politically motivated* offenders**, according to Nikos Passas[[3]](#endnote-3), lies in the intention. While ‘ordinary’ criminals commit crimes in pursuit of selfish and/or personal goals, politically motivated offenders believe that they are acting on behalf of a certain group, society or humanity as a whole. Politically motivated offenders commonly distinguish between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’, arguing that breaking the law is justified when a particular policy or the entire political or legal system are illegitimate.
     4. **Prisons and Corrections** are used interchangeably in this manual and mean the same thing. That is also true of the terms *correctional staff* and *prison staff*. Though most nations, professionals and research organizations have adopted the use of the term *corrections*, the laws of some nations use the term *prisons*.
  2. **Terrorism is not new** (from www.Terrorism-Research.com)
     1. **Terror in Antiquity: 1st -14th Century AD**  
        The earliest known organization that exhibited aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the Romans as sicarii, or dagger-men, they carried on an underground campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as any Jews they felt had collaborated with the Romans. Their motive was an uncompromising belief that they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. Eventually, the Zealot revolt became open, and they were finally besieged and committed mass suicide at the fortification of Masada.

[*The Assassins*](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465004989/trctr-20) were the next group to show recognizable characteristics of terrorism, as we know it today. A breakaway faction of Shia Islam called the Nizari Ismalis adopted the tactic of assassination of enemy leaders because the cult's limited manpower prevented open combat. Their leader, Hassam-I Sabbah, based the cult in the mountains of Northern Iran. Their tactic of sending a lone assassin to successfully kill a key enemy leader at the certain sacrifice of his own life (the killers waited next to their victims to be killed or captured) inspired fearful awe in their enemies.   
Even though both the Zealots and the Assassins operated in antiquity, they are relevant today: First as forerunners of modern terrorists in aspects of motivation, organization, targeting, and goals. Secondly, although both were ultimate failures, the fact that they are remembered hundreds of years later, demonstrates the deep psychological impact they caused.

* + 1. **Early Origins of Terrorism: 14th -18th Century**   
       From the time of the Assassins (late 13th century) to the 1700s, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare and conflict , but key ingredients for terrorism were lacking. Until the rise of the modern nation state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the sort of central authority and cohesive society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Communications were inadequate and controlled, and the causes that might inspire terrorism (religious schism, insurrection, ethnic strife) typically led to open warfare. By the time kingdoms and principalities became nations, they had sufficient means to enforce their authority and suppress activities such as terrorism.   
       The[*French Revolution*](http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/) provided the first uses of the words "Terrorist" and "Terrorism". Use of the word "terrorism" began in 1795 in reference to the Reign of Terror initiated by the Revolutionary government. The agents of the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were referred to as 'Terrorists". The French Revolution provided an example to future states in oppressing their populations. It also inspired a reaction by royalists and other opponents of the Revolution who employed terrorist tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. The Parisian mobs played a critical role at key points before, during, and after the Revolution. Such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in gruesome spectacles started long before the guillotine was first used.
    2. **Entering the Modern Era: The 19th Century**  
       During the late 19th century, radical political theories and improvements in weapons technology spurred the formation of small groups of revolutionaries who effectively attacked nation-states. Anarchists espousing belief in the "propaganda of the deed" produced some striking successes, assassinating heads of state from Russia, France, Spain, Italy, and the United States. However, their lack of organization and refusal to cooperate with other social movements in political efforts rendered anarchists ineffective as a political movement. In contrast, Communism's role as an ideological basis for political terrorism was just beginning, and would become much more significant in the 20th century.   
       Another trend in the late 19th century was the increasing tide of nationalism throughout the world, in which the nation (the identity of a people) and the political state were combined. As states began to emphasize national identities, peoples that had been conquered or colonized could, like the Jews at the times of the Zealots, opt for assimilation or struggle. The best-known nationalist conflict from this time is still unresolved - the multi-century struggles of Irish nationalism. Nationalism, like communism, became a much greater ideological force in the 20th century.  
       The terrorist group from this period that serves as a model in many ways for what was to come was the Russian [*Narodnya Volya*](http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/NarodnayaVolya.htm) (Peoples Will). They differed in some ways from modern terrorists, especially in that they would sometimes call off attacks that might endanger individuals other than their intended target. Other than this quirk, we see many of the traits of terrorism here for the first time; clandestine, cellular organization; impatience and inability for the task of organizing the constituents they claim to represent; and a tendency to increase the level of violence as pressures on the group mount.
    3. **Current Terrorism Trends**

**Terrorist incidents rose steadily from 2012 to 2014 but fell in 2015 according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (GTD).**

Although terrorism declined overall, the diversity of motivations remains broad. “The types of attacks are extremely varied in terms of tactics and ideology,” Miller said. “In the U.S., attacks have been all over the map in terms of ideology — motivated by Islamicism, anti-governmentalism and racism.” The GTD defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.”



The Middle East and North Africa region is where terrorism is by far the most common. With nearly 6,000 incidents last year, the region experienced 40 percent of all terrorist attacks; South Asia was second with about 4,600 incidents. Western Europe and North America tend to experience relatively few attacks. But in 2015 they were some of the few regions to see increases: In Western Europe, attacks rose from 214 to 321, and in North America from 34 to 62. Fatalities also rose in these areas, even as they fell elsewhere.

* 1. **Radicalization occurs for many reasons and for many different causes**
     1. **Radical causes** are as varied as there are differing views among individuals on political, social, cultural, moral, religious or economic precepts.
     2. **Religious motivated terrorism** accounts for a relatively small percent of all terrorist.
        1. Of 738 terrorist attacks in Europe between 2011 and 2014 only eight were inspired by religion.
        2. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, between 1970 and 2011, 32 percent of the perpetrator groups were motivated by ethnonationalist/separatist agendas, 28 percent were motivated by single issues such as animal rights or opposition to war, and seven percent were motivated by religious beliefs.
     3. **Reasons for joining terrorist** cause, according to Lisa Andrews, writing in the Developmental Psychology Student Newsletter from Mesa Community College’s Psychology Department[[4]](#endnote-4), based on her studies, provided a very good overview of what motivates terrorists. “In reading some of the research that has been done on terrorism, I have come to understand that every terrorist act has a specific, premeditated goal, with a predicted outcome.” The categories she identified were:

**Change**: These acts of terrorism are motivated by the achievement of a goal. This goal may be related to social, religious, or political change.

**Religious:** This group believes it is justified because of religious commands found in the Bible, Torah, Koran, and they use these same religious beliefs to recruit more followers.

**Social:** Other groups are motivated by purely social causes. Its object will be to overthrow not governments, but the economic and technological basis of the present society.

**Political:** The leaders of the given idea or movement come together, in the form of a militia or rebel group, and bring about political change in order to rid society of an undesired ruling power.

**Revenge:** There have been many instances where terrorism has been used as a means to avenge what is considered an unjust or offensive act.

**Attention:** Terrorism has been used as an effective means of gaining attention from the public eye using fear.

**Symbolism:** One thing that is important to acknowledge when speaking of terrorism is the importance of symbolism. Every terrorist act is designed to convey a specific message. Even randomly seeming terrorist acts are conveying a specific message, "We can get you anywhere, at any time. There is no one to protect you" (The Center for Mental Health Services, 1996).

Ms. Andrews summarized her paper, “Most terrorists have several motives for committing terrorist acts and several, if not all, of those mentioned above can be used in order to try to explain their motives. The only true way to determine their motives is to ask the terrorists themselves.”

Anneli Botha, a researcher with the South African Institute for Security Studies who specializes in radicalization, interviewed members of radical organizations in a number of nations. Using the results of one study (Somalia and al-Shabaab recruits), it became clear that not all did not join for the same reasons – listed in order of motivation:

* Economic reasons
* Religious and economic reasons
* Religious reasons
* Forced to join
* Personal reasons
* Religious and ethnic reasons
* Religious reasons and forced to join
* Religious and personal reasons
* Economic reasons and desire for adventure
* Desire for adventure

1. **PRISON CONSIDERATIONS specific to radicalization and violent extremist inmates**

The above information provides some background and general observations that can be modified or expanded for particular nations. It is good for a general understanding of radicalization, though far from comprehensive. It provides some information that educators, policy makers and may find of interest and use. ***However, our concern in this manual is for correction staff who are in direct contact with inmates and how they can identify inmates who might be vulnerable to or already engaged in radical or violent extremist activities AND how they work with those inmates.***

1. **Inmate Classification (Risk and Needs Assessments)**

Better managed prison systems utilize evidenced-based security classification instruments. According to Frank Porporino, a clinical psychologist and researcher with more than 40 years of experience as a front-line practitioner, tells us *“What a Security Classification instrument allows you to do is capture both some of the research informed factors related to potential for escape and or violence (e.g., age, history of violence) and then marry those with some important ‘correctional policy’ factors where some level of caution is needed in inmate classification even if the research doesn’t suggest that these factors are clearly predictive (e.g., sentence length, severity of the offence, time left to serve, and even history of prior escapes).”* If staff is going to work with inmates who may be violent extremist inmates or radical inmates or in danger of being radicalized, the more information they have about the inmates in their care the better they can do their job. At the same time, staff should know the factors that are included in the evidenced-based risk and needs assessment instruments so they can provide feedback to the classification staff. The classification process is not a one-shot operation. It is a continuing tool that is constantly reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the inmates. Thus, constant and consistent input from line staff is very important.

According to RAN P&P (Radicalization Awareness Network, Prison & Probation Working Group), The following recommendations should be considered for risk assessment focused on radicalization:

**a).** Invest in, develop and offer general awareness training to all staff. Invest in, develop and offer specific training for specialist staff.

**b).** Develop a two-step procedure of risk assessment in cases of potential radicalization.

**c).** Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability.

**d).** Practitioners carrying out risk assessments need support from peers and management

**e).** Avoid labelling by having continuous cycles of risk assessment

**f).** Running a well organised, orderly prison is a key prerequisite to avoiding further criminalisation as well as radicalization.

**g).** Prison regime choices: Concentration, dispersal or combinations

1. **Should people convicted of violent extremist acts be placed in the general population or kept separately?** The following table contains a short analysis of the advantages and disadvantages concerning these prison regimes. It is important to emphasise that that more and extensive knowledge about these regimes and how they are organised is necessary to further inform the debate on prison regimes (RAN P&P).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Regime choice** | **Potential advantages** | **Potential disadvantages** |
| ***DISPERSED:***  People suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts are placed among ‘ordinary’ prisoners and fall under the same general regime. This does not mean that offenders are placed in an ordinary unit; placement is based on risk assessment. | - Prisoners are less likely to regard themselves as marginalised because of their beliefs. They will, to some extent, be treated as ordinary prisoners.  - Prisoners might be positively influenced because of being around different groups of prisoners with different mind-sets. | - Handled by generalist staff members instead of specialists.  - Risk of radicalising other prisoners.  - Both the prisoner and his/her environment require close monitoring to identify any negative influences.  - Risk of extremists mingling with criminal networks. |
| ***CONCENTRATED/ PLACED TOGETHER:***  People suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts are placed together in a separate terrorist wing. | - All the prisoners on a terrorist wing can be completely monitored in their contacts within the wing.  - Limited opportunity to influence other prisoners.  - Individual and group work with prisoners on deradicalization/disengagement and other interventions.  - Staff on a terrorist wing become experts because they work with radicalised prisoners on a daily basis; only a small group of staff members must be trained.  - This approach may reassure the public that real and powerful measures are being taken to safeguard society. | - The terrorist wing can facilitate further radicalization/extremist acts. New bonds between extremist prisoners can be formed and this can increase the risk when they leave prison.  - Lack of contact can cause difficulties when socialising someone after their release.  - Perceptions of unfairness could lead to further radicalization of the prisoner, but also of supporters outside the prison.  - Such facilities are expensive and need capacity for urgent situations.  - Prisoners might feel stigmatised by being in a separate wing, yet others see it as a sign of raised status or credibility as an extremist. It could therefore lead to greater cohesion within the group  - Deradicalization/disengagement interventions could be hampered.  - The approach risks establishing a group with great symbolic power. |
| ***COMBINATION:***  Based on risk assessment, it is decided whether to place a person suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts in a separate or an ordinary regime. | - Tailor-made approach that fits the risk and needs of the prisoner.  - After screening and assessment, the detainee can be placed in the most appropriate regime. | - Both regimes need to be available.  - Need for robust assessment tools. |
| **Individual Separation or Transfer to Another Institution.** This is not part of the RAN P&P but worthy of consideration when appropriate - | Housing in a special housing unit for limited amounts of time to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation can be a helpful security tool. However, its use must be carefully monitored and allow for human contact frequently on a daily basis. Transfer to another facility should be tied to the needs and risk assessment along with consultation from security staff. | Does not help inmate in terms of programming and, If not handled in a fair and consistent manner, can be harmful to the institutional mission and give an inappropriate message to staff in terms of working with inmates. |

1. **Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalization and violent extremism**

(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2016,

at the 1249th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)

I. **TERMINOLOGY USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THESE GUIDELINES:**

**Radicalization** represents a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.

The R2Pris project explains: The U.S. Department of Justice defines **prisoner radicalization** as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”. According to the same source, a distinction needs to be made between prisoner radicalization and **terrorist recruitment**, which means that inmates are solicited to engage in terrorist behaviour or commit terrorist acts - “the term *prison radicalization* usually refers to individuals being radicalised in prison, not that terrorist plots are being formulated in prison”.

**Violent extremism** consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.

**Dynamic security** is a concept and a working method by which staff prioritise the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within a broader notion of security which also comprises structural, organisational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary).

II. **SCOPE**

The present Guidelines recommend measures to be taken by prison and probation services in order to prevent persons under their responsibility from being radicalised to accepting violent extremist views which may lead to terrorist acts, as well as to detect, manage and resettle radicalised persons.

Prisoners, including pre-trial detainees, as well as probationers and conditionally released offenders are the primary subjects of the interventions recommended.

Prison and probation staff are the primary actors to implement these guiding principles. Representatives of other agencies and of religious denominations working with prisoners and probationers, as well as legal counsel, family members and peer groups may also be concerned with these guiding principles.

Radicalization is a social and political problem that concerns public authorities as a whole. Prisons are only one of the institutions in which radicalization might occur, but only a comprehensive social and political approach to the root causes of the problem can efficiently address it.

Although prisoners and probationers at risk of being radicalised or of becoming violent extremists represent a small number in the Council of Europe member States, it is nevertheless important to put sufficient resources and efforts into dealing with this problem efficiently given the potential danger it represents for society.

The present Guidelines shall be applied in conformity with the relevant international human rights instruments and standards and in full compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights.

These Guidelines underscore and further develop existing Council of Europe standards and shall be read together with the rules contained in the relevant Council of Europe recommendations, in particular the European Prison Rules (Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers), the Council of Europe Probation Rules (RecommendationCM/Rec(2010)1 of the Committee of Ministers), the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11), RecommendationCM/Rec(2012)12 of the Committee of Ministers concerning foreign prisoners, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers concerning dangerous offenders and Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4 of the Committee of Ministers on electronic monitoring.

The attention to some of the most relevant rules and principles contained in the European Prison Rules is specifically drawn by listing them in the text of the Guidelines in order to remind the prison and probation services that they should not depart from these when dealing with radicalised persons under their responsibility.

**III. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

**a. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms**

1. Preventing and tackling radicalization and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalization effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalization.

2. Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion shall be respected.

**b. Respect for data protection and privacy**

3. Any supervision and restriction of contacts, communications and visits to prisoners, due to radicalization concerns, shall be proportionate to the assessed risk and shall be carried out in full respect of international human rights standards and national law related to persons deprived of their liberty and shall be in accordance with Rule 24 of the European Prison Rules concerning contact by prisoners with the outside world.

4. Where there is exchange of information related to radicalization and violent extremism between prison and probation services and national law enforcement and intelligence agencies, strict and clear procedures shall be agreed and respected in terms of privacy and data protection.

5. Those working towards the rehabilitation of prisoners should be able to operate with appropriate autonomy and independence from those engaged in intelligence gathering on violent extremists. The success of rehabilitation is indeed premised upon the trust derived from such autonomy.

**c. Imprisonment as a measure of last resort**

6. In order to effectively apply the principle according to which prison shall be used as a last resort, a variety of individually tailored sanctions and measures shall be applied where possible in order to keep offenders in the community and to improve their crime-free life prospects. Co-operation with other agencies in this respect could contribute to exchanging good practices regarding general prevention measures related to radicalization and violent extremism.

7. Young offenders may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization. In order to avoid the negative effects of imprisonment, sanctions and measures in the community shall be considered first. Additional efforts and resources shall be allocated for working with these offenders.

**d. Good prison management**

8. Good management and good order in prison shall respect diversity, tolerance and human dignity of both prisoners and staff as this helps avoid situations conducive to radicalization and violent extremism.

9. While not necessarily sufficient in themselves to trigger radicalization – violence, racism, islamophobia and other forms of discrimination – generate resentment and provide the ground for radicalizing narratives to take root. Inadequate detention conditions and overcrowding can also be factors enhancing the risk of radicalization in prison. Tackling these issues should therefore be considered as an integral part of the counter-radicalization effort.

10. Similarly, radicalization processes can be accentuated and reinforced when disproportionate measures are deployed by the prison administration. Therefore, punitive measures, use of force and means of restraint shall be proportionate to direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety and security in a given prison in order to preserve to the extent possible relations of trust and support in helping the reintegration of the offender.

11. Prison management shall involve consulting staff and, subject to the needs of good order, safety and security, taking the opinion of prisoners on matters of concern regarding the general conditions of imprisonment.

12. Prisoners’ feelings of safety and trust in the legitimacy of staff’s actions are likely to induce positive change and facilitate their rehabilitation and resettlement. Every effort shall therefore be made to preserve and build on such relations of trust in order to help offenders start or develop a crime-free life.

13. As much as possible, prison and probation services shall select and recruit staff with relevant linguistic abilities and cultural sensitivity. Intercultural and multifaith awareness training for staff shall form an integral part of education and training in order to promote understanding of and tolerance to diversity of beliefs and traditions.

14. Staff shall be selected, supported and trained in order to develop and maintain their professional ethics and resilience to potential pressure leading to radicalization.

15. Educational activities are essential in the rehabilitation process of probationers or prisoners that may have adopted violent extremist views. Not only does it provide a structure to the daily routines during imprisonment, but it also provides the opportunity to develop new skills that can facilitate resettlement.

16. Tackling the issue of radicalization in prison requires that good prison management is not only related to high professional ethics and attitudes but requires adequate resources. This can mean that additional funds might be needed for recruitment and training.

**IV. PRISON AND PROBATION WORK**

**a. Assessment**

17. Risk and needs assessment should be carried out by multi-disciplinary teams. When initial and subsequent risk and needs assessment of offenders is carried out, special attention shall be paid to identify offenders vulnerable to radicalization. In conformity with the existing national procedures regarding risk assessment, offenders’ views should be recorded in relation to this and offenders should be given the opportunity to challenge such assessments.

18. In order to establish individual treatment programmes aimed at successful rehabilitation of prisoners and probationers, assessment tools specifically tailored to identify risks of radicalization shall be developed and used from the outset of the implementation of a penal sanction or measure and repeated at regular intervals as necessary when there is a concern that the prisoner might be undergoing a process of radicalization.

**b. Admission to prison and allocation**

19. Special attention shall be paid to admission procedures of all prisoners as the good carrying out of such procedures allows feelings of trust and safety to be established in prisoners, enabling proper assessment of their health condition at entry, and contributing to good risk and needs assessment, sentence planning, classification, allocation and accommodation.

20. Regardless of whether prisoners sentenced for terrorist-related crimes are kept in separate prisons or wings or are dispersed across the prison system, the risk they may pose, including the risk of radicalising other prisoners, shall be evaluated individually before their allocation is defined and shall be reviewed at regular intervals.

**c. High-security prisons or high-security sections in prison and prison transfers**

21. The need to keep prisoners sentenced for terrorist-related crimes in high security prisons or under high levels of security in ordinary prisons shall also be evaluated individually and such decisions shall be reviewed at regular intervals. Rule 53 of the European Prison Rules, regulating the use of special high security or safety measures, shall apply in such cases. Furthermore, as stated in rule 70 of the European Prison Rules, any prisoner subjected to such measures shall have a right of complaint and appeal to an independent authority.

22. The regular transfers of prisoners sentenced for terrorist-related crimes may have a negative impact on the reintegration prospects of such prisoners. The need for such transfers shall therefore be carefully evaluated on an individual basis against the risk posed by such prisoners.

**d. Culture and religion**

23. In accordance with Rule 29 of the European Prison Rules, cultural and religious traditions shall be taken into account regarding nutrition and as far as practicable regarding clothing, opportunities for worship and religious holidays. Where possible, prisoners shall be allowed to take their meals at times that meet their religious requirements.

24. Prison services shall be encouraged to establish agreements with religious denominations in order to allow a number of approved religious representatives proportionate to the number of prisoners of the same faith in a given prison to enter the institution. Religious representatives should be properly trained on how to exercise their functions in a prison environment.

25. In order to induce positive personal change in prisoners, preferences shall be given to religious representatives who are attuned to the cultural norms and values and conversant in the languages spoken by the prisoners. Sufficient time, adequate space and resources shall be provided to enable approved religious representatives to meet prisoners in private and to hold collective services.

**e. Inter-agency co-operation**

26. Prison and probation services shall co-operate with each other as well as with other law enforcement agencies at local, national and international level, as dealing with radicalization and violent extremism leading to terrorist acts requires a comprehensive approach based on professional standards.

27. Prison and probation services shall co-operate with other public and private agencies and wider civil society in order to provide aftercare and to contribute to the resettlement and reintegration of offenders.

28. It is in the interest of the prison and probation services to collect knowledge and best practices and share these internationally.

**V. DETECTION, PREVENTION AND DEALING WITH RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON**

**a. Use of dynamic security**

29. Frontline staff shall be trained to act in line with principles of dynamic security in order to maintain safety, security and good order in prison and to contribute to the prisoner’s rehabilitation. They should be trained in particular to use intercultural mediation and different techniques of intervention in case of crisis management.

**b. Procedures for detection**

30. Frontline staff shall be trained and supported in order to be able to distinguish between religious practices and the adoption of violent extremist behavior and shall be empowered to react swiftly and proportionately in case of real and imminent risks posed to the life, health or personal integrity of prisoners or staff. In particular, staff shall be given tools to report concerns regarding signs of radicalization to violent extremism and appropriate procedures shall be applied to assess promptly and professionally such risks.

31. Where specific tools and methods for identifying radicalized prisoners are developed and used by prison and probation services in order to help their frontline staff, these shall be based on professional and ethical standards and shall be reviewed and updated on a regular basis.

32. When developing indicators of radicalization, staff shall be warned that such indicators are not to be considered in isolation but in the context of personal features and specific circumstances of a given case in order to avoid arbitrary conclusions.

33. Adequately trained members of prison or probation staff may be appointed as necessary, in case radicalization is an issue of concern in a given prison or probation area, in order to ensure that staff know where they can readily obtain advice on radicalization issues and prisoners or probationers know how to report concerns about radicalization.

**c. Special programmes**

34. Special programs, including the use of mentors, shall be developed for and offered to prisoners and probationers, where appropriate, and in particular for those who are considered susceptible to radicalization, in order to help them find life options free from crime and violent extremism. Specially trained staff shall be involved in carrying out or supervising such programs.

35. Former violent extremists who have renounced violence may serve as legitimate actors for the rehabilitation of probationers or prisoners.

36. Involvement of religious representatives, volunteers, peers and family members can also be considered on a case-by-case basis as they may be very beneficial for efficient reintegration of offenders.

**VI. POST-RELEASE WORK**

37. In order to aim at successful reintegration, prison and probation services shall not work in isolation, but communicate and establish links with community organisations in order to ensure the continuation of special programmes developed during imprisonment or probation after release, or after probation supervision ends, where appropriate.

38. Similarly, former prisoners shall be assisted in contacting different support structures in the community. On a case-by-case basis, the involvement of families and social networks shall be considered, as these may affect positively the resettlement process.

39. Electronic monitoring schemes and other control measures shall be combined with other professional interventions and supportive measures aimed at the social reintegration of radicalised offenders.

**VII. RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND COMMUNICATION**

40. Sufficient resources shall be allocated to carry out scientific research and evaluation of existing programmes tackling radicalization. Any such programme shall be knowledge-based and shall be regularly reviewed.

41. In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media shall be carried out.

1. **The impact of prison on individuals and its potential impact on inmate’s acceptance of radical thoughts and violent extremist behavior.** What follows is not meant to excuse the bad behavior of some inmates, but rather to remind staff of some of the factors. The more staff understands how the prison environment impacts on some inmates (and on some staff), the better able they will be to identify warning signs that the potential of radicalization or violent behavior based on extremism might exist.
   1. Dr. John Cacioppo, Director of the University of Chicago Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, noted that: “Perceived social isolation. *You can feel isolated in a crowd.* You can also choose to be alone and feel blissful solitude. *When people feel others around them are threats rather than sources of cooperation and compassion, they feel socially isolated, lonely.*”

**“**Loneliness has a lot in common with pain, hunger, and thirst. You would not want to be in these states, at least not for very long, but each has evolved as an aversive biological signal that motivates us to do something that’s good for us as individuals and as a species. Physical pain motivates us to take care of our physical body. Loneliness motivates us to take care of our social body, and in doing so, it fosters caring about others and being willing to work to stay together. We’re a fundamentally social species, and a social animal that is isolated is almost certain to live a shorter, more miserable life.”

Lonely people are often completely unaware that their brain has gone on alert. “An isolated rat put in an open field will walk around the walls and avoid the middle, which is called predator evasion. We find lonely people are hypersensitive to social threats.”

“The more lonely you are when you see a negative social picture, the less likely you are to activate the temporoparietal junction. Lonely people, focused on self-preservation, take other people’s dire circumstances less seriously. Consistent with that, we’ve done an experience sampling study, where we beep people nine times a day for seven days. We find lonely and connected people in the same circumstances, but lonely people interpret the stressors as more stressful.”

* 1. Australian researchers, Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington and Peter Bell described inmate vulnerability and its impact on radicalization as follows:

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment a recruiter can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states

of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness). This unbalanced emotional state is

ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the impressionable.

There are also instances where an incarcerated individual can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are

incarcerated in another country and do not speak the language. For instance, in the UK, the proportion of foreign national prisoners has increased steadily

over the past decade. In the 1990s the foreign population accounted for around 8% of the total population and this increased to 13% by 2012. Many of these foreign prisoners have little knowledge of the country, let alone the culture of the country, and to top it off many do not speak the language (having lived, worked and/or socialised in their immigrant communities), thus making the individual more susceptible and vulnerable to extremist groups.

One theory that can help us understand prisoner vulnerability is the Transformative Learning Theory (TLT) developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow. This is a framework for understanding how change (learning)

occurs in individuals—more specifically, how adults learn and adapt to new environments. In this instance we are using it to understand the behavioural

changes prisoners undergo while in prison and how this learning transformation makes them more vulnerable to radical extremists.

When an individual goes through some sort of crisis (known as the transformative trigger), the individual uses pre-existing habits to make sense of the event. However, when the individual cannot make sense of the situation and resorting back to their habitual ways fails to help them manage the event

this becomes known as a 'distortion'. As a result, the individual reacts to the meaning distortion by exploring new experiences and undergoing critical

reflection (e.g. turning to religion for guidance). These new perspectives help the individual cope with the new environment by helping create new

behaviours, roles, and relationships. Overall, this transformation allows individuals to manage their new environment, adapt to a new daily routine and

ultimately help an individual learn how to get past a crisis. However, going through a crisis can make the individual easier to persuade and even more open to manipulation and brainwashing, thus making them very susceptible to extremist recruitment.

TLT can help shed light on the process and precursors of prison radicalization. Individual radicalization is not only associated with particular socio-political contexts (e.g. prison) and personal characteristics, but is also a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition and identity reassessment. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or experience confusion over identity or intense personal debate, eventually a point is reached whereby the individual comes to the realisation that their old identity no longer exists and a new one must be

established. Therefore, when radicalized individuals socialise and are validated by other 'like-minded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced

and the new identity is strengthened. Ultimately, those individuals who become violent, radicalized inmates not only justify their actions but such actions are also expected among the greater group of radicals.

* 1. The United Kingdom’s Prison Reform Trust in assessing the potential for mental health damage a prison can inflict, said:

*. . . for the majority of prisoners, imprisonment was likely to have the following effects:*

*\* isolation from families and social networks*

*\* austere surroundings, loss of privacy and poor physical and hygienic conditions*

*\* aggression, bullying, fear, suspicion and the attitudes of unsympathetic and uninformed staff*

*\* lack of purposeful activity, of personal control, of power to act and loss of identity;*

*\* pressure to escape or to take drugs*

*\* shame and stigmatisation*

*\* uncertainty, particularly among remand prisoners, and concern about re-integration into the outside world.*

1. **Radicalization Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP)** developed by the R2pris consortium. What follows is a draft that might be copied or modified by institutions developing their own tools.

**Radicalization** **R**isk **A**ssessment in **P**risons

**(RRAP)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Risk | | |
| Never  (low risk) | Sometimes (moderate risk) | Always (High risk) |
| **Legitimization of terrorism**1 |  |  |  |
| Openly manifests support for events related to political/religious terrorism. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Openly exhibit sympathy towards terrorist leaders. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Do not openly condemn terrorist actions carried out by political/religious terrorist groups. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Inmate convicted or accused of activities related to terrorism is admired by other inmates. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Carries out activities which may be considered as military training in his daily routines. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Activism**2 |  |  |  |
| Shows interest in join/belong to an organization that fights for his group’s political and legal rights. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Would donate money to an organization that fights for his group’s political and legal rights. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Shows interest in volunteer his time working (i.e., write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.) for an organization that fights for his group’s political and legal rights. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Radicalism**2 | | | |
| Would support an organization that fights for his group’s political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Would support an organization that fights for his group’s political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Would participate in a public protest against oppression of his group even if he thought the protest might turn violent. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Would attack police or security forces if he saw them beating members of my group. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Perceived in-group superiority**3 | | | |
| Believes that… | | | |
| …some groups of people are just more worthy than others. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| …If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| … Inferior groups should stay in their place. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| … Social equality should be increased. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| **Emotional Uncertainty**4 |  |  |  |
| Hesitates when it comes to making changes. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Feels angry when a situation is unclear. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Tends to give up easily when he doesn’t clearly understand a situation. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Feels anxious when things are changing. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| When the future is uncertain, he/she generally expects the worst to happen. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Identity Fusion and Identification**5 | | | |
| Feels immersed in his/her group/country. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Has a deep emotional bond with his/her group/country. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Is very interested in what citizens of others countries think about his/her country. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Feels embarrassed If a story in the media criticized his/her group/country. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Distance and societal disconnection**6 | | | |
| Distanced itself to people who live and think differently. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Feels at home in this country. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Feels distanced to the country main stream culture. | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Shares norms and values with people from this country. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| **Protective Items**7 | | | |
| Family support for non-violence. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Community support for non-violence. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Re-interpretation of ideology less rigid, absolute. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Rejection of violence to obtain goals. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Change of vision of enemy. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Involvement with non-violent, de-radicalization, offence related programs. | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| **Demographic Items**8 | | | |
| Age (< 30 = High; > 30 = low) | 0 |  | 2 |
| Gender (Female = low; Male = high) | 0 |  | 2 |
| Marital Status (Married = low; Unmarried = Moderate; Married with other terrorists family members = High) | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| **Total** | | |  |

1 Adapted from Trujillo, Jordán, Gutiérrez, and González-Cabrera (2009)

2 Adapted from Trujillo and Moyano (2016)

3 Adapter from Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin (2006)

4 Adapted fromGreco and Roger (2001)

5 Adapted from Gómez et al. (2011)

6 Adapted from Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos (2013)

7 From Pressman (2009)

8 Adapted from Pressman (2009)

1. **Draft Lesson Plan on Working with Radical and Violent Extremist Offenders**

LESSON PLAN R-VEO – Introduction to Radical and Violent Extremist Inmates

Method of Instruction: Lecture, Discussion, Question and Answer

Time Frame: 6 Hours

Performance Objectives: At the conclusion of this block of instruction the student will:

1. be able to describe, in terms of potentially radical and violent extremist offenders:
   * 1. An understanding of how they differ from other inmates
     2. An understanding of how the prison experience can help inmates become radicalized
     3. An understanding of the different reasons individuals become radicalized
2. understand, at the current time, what radical or extremist organizations are represented in the nation’ prison population
3. be able to explain basic human rights and treatment options as they apply to radical and violent extremist offenders
4. understand some of the signs indicating individuals are vulnerable to or are becoming radicalized
5. be aware of security issues exacerbated by radical and violent extremist offenders
6. be familiar with personal safety procedures
7. understand how they can aid in an offenders return to society and remain crime free

References: Staff Training on Radicalization and Violent Extremist Inmates Manual

Training Aides Required: PowerPoint Projector, Blackboard or Flip Chart

INTRODUCTION

To ask why people become radicals or violent extremists, is like asking why people become criminals. Though there is much research and even more theories, the important issues for those of us in corrections, especially those on the front line who are in daily contact with inmates, is how do we identify potential radicals and extremist violent offenders:

* How do we work with them in such a way that we and our corrections system don’t lose our ethical standards of humane treatment?
* What can we do to help divert such inmates from acts of violence?
* Can they be trusted in programs and could some be de-radicalized or disengaged from radical and violent acts once they are released? and
* Does their presence in our facilities make our job more difficult and more dangerous?

Of major importance to all of us is to understand the offenders in our care and to treat them, as we do all offenders, with dignity and respect. Our job is to insure the safety of our fellow staff, the inmates and the public while the offenders are in our care. Our job is also to insure, as much as possible, that our actions to not make the offenders worse or more dangerous. In addition to being the keepers of security within our institutions and providers of intelligence to our own intelligence and classification teams, we are also responsible to help with inmate programming and preparation for release.

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES**:

As major points are made, such as the definitions of radicals and violent extremist offenders or lists of factors that contribute to radicalization, they should be listed on the blackboard or flip chart. In some cases, such as the definitions, have one of the students read a definition and then ask the class to discuss what it means. Watch the class to insure all are engaged and seem to understand the definitions.

I. **Definition of terms** – other groups or individuals may have slightly different definitions. These are presented so when we use the terms in our work, we will all have the same understanding.

* 1. Definitions (general)
     1. **Radicalization** represents a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.
     2. **Violent extremism** consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts that may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.
     3. **United Nations definition** of terrorism does not exist. Although terrorism is a main program area of the United Nations, countries cannot come up with a common definition because some nations want to exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination. In common terms some would say, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”
     4. **Terrorism definition used in this manual** comes from the United States Library of Congress Federal Research Division:

*Definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually inadequate. Even terrorism researchers often neglect to define the term other than by citing the basic U.S. Department of State (1998) definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Although an act of violence that is generally regarded in the United States as an act of terrorism may not be viewed so in another country, the type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, such as ordinary crime or a wartime military action, can still be defined in terms that might qualify as reasonably objective.*

*This social sciences research defines a terrorist action as* ***the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.***

* 1. **Definitions** (applied to corrections)
     1. **Terrorism Inmates** are incarcerated persons who, as a result of being radicalized either prior to, or during imprisonment, engage in the following activities: recruitment of other prisoners; supporting extremist groups from prison; getting support from extremist groups outside prison; preparing for violent extremist/ideological inspired illegal acts after release; terrorist ideology-inspired hostility to other groups of prisoners and/or staff; increasing of their radicalization level because of grievances/frustrations/anger related to being in prison.
     2. **Rehabilitation** in this manual is defined as the process where individuals or groups cease their involvement in organized violence and/or terrorism. The process can involve de-radicalization and/or disengagement. While de-radicalization aims for substantive changes in individuals’ ideology and attitudes, disengagement concentrates on facilitating behavioral change. “The disengaged terrorist may not be ‘de-radicalized’ or repent at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support.
     3. **Prisons and Corrections** are used interchangeably in this manual and mean the same thing. That is also true of the terms *correctional staff* and *prison staff*. Though most nations, professionals and research organizations have adopted the use of the term *corrections*, the laws of some nations use the term *prisons*.
     4. **Prisoner Radicalization**

The U.S. Department of Justice defines **prisoner radicalization** as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”. According to the same source, a distinction needs to be made between prisoner radicalization and **terrorist recruitment**, which means that inmates are solicited to engage in terrorist behaviour or commit terrorist acts - “the term *prison radicalization* usually refers to individuals being radicalised in prison, not that terrorist plots are being formulated in prison”.

* + 1. **Violent extremism** consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.
    2. **Dynamic security** is a concept and a working method by which staff prioritize the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within a broader notion of security which also comprises structural, organizational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary).

II. **Terrorism is not new**

While the news media, politicians, our friends and even some of us talk as though the current threat of terrorism and radicalization is either something new or has taken a big jump over the past couple of years, let me assure you that is not true. Take time to review the section on General Observations in our Staff Training on Radicalization and Violent Extremist Inmates Manual. For those of you with computer capabilities, do a web search, use Google or Bing or Yahoo or Ask or whichever one you like best, and type in “History of Terrorism”. It is also true that prisons systems have dealt with violent extremist inmates for many years. Security Threat Groups (STG) composed of organized crime, criminal gangs, have been in prisons system almost since the beginning of the use of prisons. Lone anarchists, religious and political fanatics and related groups of offenders have been imprisoned in almost every nation of the world throughout the history of the use of prisons. It is also true that, for the most part, the incarceration of radicals and violent extremists has not disrupted prison operations nor caused undue safety problems to staff and other offenders.

However, the current emphasis on radical and extremist violent offenders and the growing sophistication of some terrorist organizations, coupled with the availability of information on the internet and in social media on how to make bombs and weapons and how to cause disruption has produced new concerns for correctional personnel.

1. **How radical and violent extremist offenders might differ from “normal” inmates**

It has to do with intentions. While ‘ordinary’ criminals commit crimes in pursuit of selfish and/or personal goals, politically motivated offenders believe that they are acting on behalf of a certain group, society or humanity as a whole. Politically motivated offenders commonly distinguish between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’, arguing that breaking the law is justified when a particular policy or the entire political or legal system are illegitimate.

1. **Potential impact of prison experience on radicalization**

It is helpful to understand how the prison experience can help inmates become radicalized – the impact of the prison experience can also effect staff. Discuss the following statements in your groups in terms of how this may, or may not, impact on an individual’s susceptibility to radicalization or violent behavior. You will have about 15 minutes per statement so the group leader must also be a good time keeper and make sure the discussion stays on subject.

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES**:

Divide the participants into groups of no more than 10 individuals and have each group work independently. The groups should have different members read the statements and have the group discuss it. Have one person from the group note the groups comments and at the end of the discussion period (approximately 45 minutes) have the group recorders present any conclusions or observations that may differ from what others may have noted. While the discussions are taking place, the instructor should visit each group, not to participate, but to insure they are staying on topic and that all are participating. Hand out a sheet to each participant with statements on it and with room for notes (see attached form in the Appendix)

* 1. Statement One:

Dr. John Cacioppo, Director of the University of Chicago Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, noted that: “Perceived social isolation. *You can feel isolated in a crowd.* You can also choose to be alone and feel blissful solitude. *When people feel others around them are threats rather than sources of cooperation and compassion, they feel socially isolated, lonely.*”

Lonely people are often completely unaware that their brain has gone on alert. We find lonely people are hypersensitive to social threats. Lonely people, focused on self-preservation, take other people’s dire circumstances less seriously.

* 1. Statement Two:

Australian researchers, Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington and Peter Bell described inmate vulnerability and its impact on radicalization as follows:

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment a recruiter can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness). This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the impressionable. There are also instances where an incarcerated individual can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are incarcerated in another country and do not speak the language.

* 1. Statement three:

The United Kingdom’s Prison Reform Trust in assessing the potential for mental health damage a prison can inflict, said:

*. . . for the majority of prisoners, imprisonment was likely to have the following effects:*

*\* isolation from families and social networks*

*\* austere surroundings, loss of privacy and poor physical and hygienic conditions*

*\* aggression, bullying, fear, suspicion and the attitudes of unsympathetic and uninformed staff*

*\* lack of purposeful activity, of personal control, of power to act and loss of identity;*

*\* pressure to escape or to take drugs*

*\* shame and stigmatization*

*\* uncertainty, particularly among remand prisoners, and concern about re-integration into the outside world.*

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES:**

During the summaries by the group leaders, be sure they stay focused on if they see these as true or merely hypotheticals. See if they have any to add not covered above. Encourage the students to look at the practical aspects of this type of information. For example, if treating inmates with respect or helping insure their safety could help overcome some of the negative impacts of incarceration in a way that would defer some from looking at radical or violent behavior. Also indicate how their body language and the way they talk to inmates plays a role in how well inmates can adjust to incarceration. Give each student a copy of the Student Worksheet.

Student Worksheet:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Statement | Student Notes |
| a. Statement One:  Dr. John Cacioppo, Director of the University of Chicago Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, noted that: “Perceived social isolation. You can feel isolated in a crowd. You can also choose to be alone and feel blissful solitude. When people feel others around them are threats rather than sources of cooperation and compassion, they feel socially isolated, lonely.”  Lonely people are often completely unaware that their brain has gone on alert. We find lonely people are hypersensitive to social threats. Lonely people, focused on self-preservation, take other people’s dire circumstances less seriously. |  |
| b. Statement Two:  Australian researchers, Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington and Peter Bell described inmate vulnerability and its impact on radicalization as follows:  When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment a recruiter can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness). This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the impressionable. There are also instances where an incarcerated individual can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are incarcerated in another country and do not speak the language. |  |
| c. Statement three:  The United Kingdom’s Prison Reform Trust in assessing the potential for mental health damage a prison can inflict, said:  . . . for the majority of prisoners, imprisonment was likely to have the following effects:  \* isolation from families and social networks  \* austere surroundings, loss of privacy and poor physical and hygienic conditions  \* aggression, bullying, fear, suspicion and the attitudes of unsympathetic and uninformed staff  \* lack of purposeful activity, of personal control, of power to act and loss of identity;  \* pressure to escape or to take drugs  \* shame and stigmatization  \* uncertainty, particularly among remand prisoners, and concern about re-integration into the outside world. |  |

1. Why do inmates become radicalized?
   1. **Radicalization occurs for many reasons and for many different causes**
      1. **Radical causes** are as varied as there are differing views among individuals on political, social, cultural, moral, religious or economic precepts.
      2. **Religious motivated terrorism** accounts for a relatively small percent of all terrorist.
         1. Of 738 terrorist attacks in Europe between 2011 and 2014 only eight were inspired by religion.
         2. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, between 1970 and 2011, 32 percent of the perpetrator groups were motivated by ethnonationality/separatist agendas, 28 percent were motivated by single issues such as animal rights or opposition to war, and seven percent were motivated by religious beliefs.
      3. **Reasons for joining terrorist** cause, according to Lisa Andrews, writing in the Developmental Psychology Student Newsletter from Mesa Community College’s Psychology Department[[5]](#endnote-5), based on her studies, provided a very good overview of what motivates terrorists. “In reading some of the research that has been done on terrorism, I have come to understand that every terrorist act has a specific, premeditated goal, with a predicted outcome.” The categories she identified were:

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES:**

Have a different member of the class read each reason. If some of the students seem confused or look like they disagree, allow for some discussion. At this time, if the information exists, have a member of the prison intelligence team or classification committee provide information to the class on the types of radicals or violent extremist inmates currently, or in the recent past, living within the facilities where the students will be working. Be sure their presentations are specific and evidenced-based, rather than general presentations about terrorist groups.

**Change**: These acts of terrorism are motivated by the achievement of a goal. This goal may be related to social, religious, or political change.

**Religious:** This group believes it is justified because of religious commands found in the Bible, Torah, Koran, and they use these same religious beliefs to recruit more followers.

**Social:** Other groups are motivated by purely social causes. Its object will be to overthrow not governments, but the economic and technological basis of the present society.

**Political:** The leaders of the given idea or movement come together, in the form of a militia or rebel group, and bring about political change in order to rid society of an undesired ruling power.

**Revenge:** There have been many instances where terrorism has been used as a means to avenge what is considered an unjust or offensive act.

**Attention:** Terrorism has been used as an effective means of gaining attention from the public eye using fear.

**Symbolism:** One thing that is important to acknowledge when speaking of terrorism is the importance of symbolism. Every terrorist act is designed to convey a specific message. Even randomly seeming terrorist acts are conveying a specific message, "We can get you anywhere, at any time. There is no one to protect you" (The Center for Mental Health Services, 1996).

Ms. Andrews summarized her paper, “Most terrorists have several motives for committing terrorist acts and several, if not all, of those mentioned above can be used in order to try to explain their motives. The only true way to determine their motives is to ask the terrorists themselves.”

Anneli Botha, a researcher with the South African Institute for Security Studies who specializes in radicalization, interviewed members of radical organizations in a number of nations. Using the results of one study (Somalia and al-Shabaab recruits), it became clear that not all did not join for the same reasons – listed in order of motivation:

* Economic reasons
* Religious and economic reasons
* Religious reasons
* Forced to join
* Personal reasons
* Religious and ethnic reasons
* Religious reasons and forced to join
* Religious and personal reasons
* Economic reasons and desire for adventure
* Desire for adventure

VI. **Human rights considerations in the incarceration of radical and violent extremist offenders**

**Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms**

1. Preventing and tackling radicalization and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalization effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalization.

2. Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion shall be respected. Review the lessons you received in your basic training on international standards. They all apply to radical and violent extremist offenders as well.

3. It is possible that some extra restrictions may be placed on some radical and violent extremist offenders based on their behavior, risk assessment and classification. Therefore, punitive measures, use of force and means of restraint shall be proportionate to the direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety and security in a given prison in order to preserve, to the extent possible, relations of trust and support in helping the reintegration of the offender.

1. **Behavioral factors that may indicate an individual is becoming radicalized**.

**These are indicators only.** They are meant as potential warning signs and should be communicated to intelligence and supervisory staff. If felt important by supervisory staff, the correctional officer(s) may be given specific behaviors to look for when interacting with the inmate in question.

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES**:

If the item appears to be confusing to some of the students, explain it or have the group discuss it.

* The individual abruptly abandons friends and family members.
* In the increasingly rare occasions where they do see their family, they berate them for their supposedly impious behavior.
* They stop participating in activities that used to occupy a lot of their time such as sports or group activities/associations.
* They believe they have found the true path to religious enlightenment, usually in the form of radical Sunnism, and anyone else who doesn't follow it is of less worth.
* They often exhibit growing hatred and intolerance towards others who don't adhere to their beliefs. This could be political, social, cultural or religious beliefs.
* This includes rejecting fellow Muslims of different sects, as well as Imams who repudiate violence.
* They refuse to engage with or debate ideas that counter their own.
* They turn their back on their life as it was before radicalization.
* Individual change in appearance
  + Beard
  + Clothing
  + Gang signs
* They develop obsessive patterns of behavior and they pine for martyrdom and the apocalypse.
* They avoid other inmates
* They speak in admiration of terrorists or terrorist acts
* They participate with terrorist or radical groups
* They begin physical training such a body building
* The avoid contact with staff
* They donate money to groups with radical beliefs or leaders
* They request transfer to another wing
* They request special food
* They increase their appeals and legal filings
* They increase contact with human rights and NGO organizations

If there is a group of inmates seemingly forming an organization (formal or informal)

* The group seeks self-government or control of its members
* The group starts a joint canteen account (either formally or informally)
* The group establishes strict discipline of its members (talking to staff without permission of the group leaders, assigning punishments for violation of group protocol, etc.)
* The group accepts leadership and direction for outside organizations or individuals
* The group tries to control work assignments of their members
* The group appoints a speaker for the group (individuals not allowed to talk to staff on their own)
* The group establishes classes on ideology, languages, “how to” on skills that could be useful to terrorists
* The group establishes joint prayer
* The group attempts communications with other prisons
* The group begins to contact non-group inmates to enhance group goals, resources or influence
* The group increases contact with NGOs, lawyers, legislators or others

AGAIN – remember that none of these are proof of radicalization. They are potential signs and should be considered in conjunction with other behaviors. However, from a correction officer standpoint, if you are not sure the best rule is “*If you see something, say something*” – let your intelligence team know and also make sure the staff replacing you on the next shift knows of your observation and concern.

1. **Special Security**
   1. Personal Safety

Much of the following comes from material developed by the New Zealand Department of Corrections and is augmented by advice from other services. Also, you will recognize that some of what follows has been covered in other training you have received – it is a good reminder to continue to review and update your knowledge of good correctional practice.

* + 1. **Safety is a top priority for Corrections.** While at work you have been taught procedures and approaches that are designed to keep you safe while you manage offenders, including radical and violent extremist offenders. Treating everyone, including offenders, with dignity and respect will go a long way to ensuring you and your workmates stay safe.

Most Corrections staff go about life outside without fear or concern. Most staff will never have any problems.

However, the fact remains that some offenders may be threatening or dangerous. They, or their associates, may threaten you, or may try to get personal information – such as your home address – for criminal purposes.

**Remember, it is not OK for anyone to threaten you.** If you are threatened, report it to your supervisor – even if you don’t believe the person will carry out the threat.

Not all staff will want or need to take all the steps we will cover. It is about assessing the risk for you and taking what action is sensible.

Corrections recommends that if you work directly with offenders you keep your information as private as possible as a precautionary measure. What follows will help you to:

* safeguard your personal information
* think about ‘common sense’ security for you and your family
* take the right action if someone threatens you

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES:**

Have a different member of the class read each item. If some of the students seem confused or look like they disagree, allow for some discussion.

* + 1. Protecting personal information
* **Private information should stay private.** Remember that when you are at work, offenders may be present. Don’t discuss anything private about yourself or others if an offender could be listening. If you must discuss something private, close the door.
* Think about written information as well– could an offender see anything in private in your bag or on your computer screen? Lock private files away and lock your computer screen if you are away from your station. *Be careful what you put in the rubbish bin.*
* Don’t give any information to an offender or member of the public who asks for your private details or those of a colleague (things like cell phone number or home address).
* Know who you are talking to

Check that the person you are talking to really is who they say they are – especially if they are asking for private information about another staff member or offender. For example, if you receive a call from a person claiming to be a police officer, rather than give them the information directly, call their police station and ask to be put through to them.

* Online Social Media
  + Don’t post anything that shows you work for corrections
  + Don’t post personal information such as dates of birth, maiden names, names and details of children
  + Think carefully before accepting friend requests – is the person really a friend? If not sure, it is OK to ignore the request.
  + Use privacy controls on sites like Facebook so that only approved users can view your page. You can usually restrict who can share information and photos you have posted to your page so other users can’t forward your information.
  + There is no guarantees of privacy, even with tight security settings. Anything you put on a social networking site can be cut, pasted, and sent simply by taking a ‘screen shot’.
  + Photos are often ‘tagged’ so that the names of the people in the photo are given.
  + When using social networking on smart devices such as iPhones or iPads, users can ‘check in’ to locations, which simply shows where they are. This information could be used to track down that user by criminals.
  + Photos taken on smart devices are often geo-tagged (geographical data is imprinted into the photo properties which shows where the photo was taken). When these photos are uploaded to social networking sites, this data often remains. If a user has uploaded a photo of their house or vegetable garden, others could potentially use the geo-data embedded in the photo to obtain the user’s home address.
  + Talk to your family – especially children – about ways to stay safe on-line.
* Security at work
  + Know your colleagues. It is an easy way to ensure that any strangers who gain access to a corrections site are easily identified.
  + Beware of ‘ghosting’ – when a person follows behind a staff member and gains access to secure areas by slipping through gates or doors before they close.
  + On a large site it is impossible to know everyone, so stay alert and if you see someone unfamiliar check they have a visible ID card. All staff are allowed to challenge an unknown person and ask to see proof that they are allowed to be there – but make sure it’s safe to do so. If you are alone you should call for back-up or find a colleague before you challenge someone.
* Security outside of work
  + Tell someone where you are going and when you’ll be back,
  + If you are walking at night, stay on brightly lit, well-used streets as much as possible.
  + If you must take a poorly lit route, walk near the curb or well away from shrubbery, dark doorways and other places of concealment. Be alert and avoid ‘short cuts’ through dark alleys or deserted parks.
  + If taking your car, don’t leave anything on view that could associate you with corrections.
  + Park in well-lit areas and always close your car windows and lock the doors.
* Security at home
  + All families should have a safety plan, which agrees with what everyone will do in an emergency. This is also good to have in case of a natural disaster such as an earthquake.
  + A safety plan should be developed and agreed upon by all members of the household. Every plan will be unique to the circumstances, but following are some things to include or consider:
    - What will you each do in the event of an emergency?
    - How and where will you meet up in the event that home is no longer safe?
    - How will you contact each other in cases of an emergency? If you can’t contact someone, who or where will you leave a message?
    - What will you need to do for members of the household with disability or special requirements?
    - What will need to be done for pets, domestic animals, livestock if home is no longer safe?
    - Who will be responsible for collecting children from school if you need to relocate in a short amount of time?
    - Who could help you or where could you go if you need to relocate in a short amount of time?
  + Home Security
    - Always check who is at the door before opening it – consider having a door chain or security peep-hole installed **AND** never open the door if you are suspicious in any way.
    - After dark close the curtains so people can’t look in.
    - Check all doors and windows are secure before going to bed, leaving the house (even if you are only leaving for a few minutes) or going to a different part of the house.
    - Keep a strong ‘courtesy’ light by the front and back door on at night – it could be operated by a motion sensor.
    - If you go out at night, prepare your return by turning on outside lights. Some inside lights should also be left on.
    - Keep track of your house keys and never leave one outside in an obvious place (such as under a mat or in a mail box).
    - Arrange for fixed times for workmen to call – check their identity and never leave them in the house on their own.
    - Check parcels/deliveries before accepting them.
    - Trim bushes or trees that are close to the house.
    - Talk to children and teenagers about staying safe (e.g. how to open the door or answer the phone).
  + IF YOU SEE SOMETHING YOU THINK IS SUSPICIOUS
    - Report to police any suspicious vehicle or people loitering near your home. Before you do so, get as much information as possible, such as:
      * Description of the individual and what he/she is doing
      * Description of the car including make, color and registration
    - IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, IF YOU HEAR SOMETHING, IF YOU SUSPECT SOMETHING – SAY SOMETHING
  + Telephone Security
    - Be wary about giving personal information out on the phone, especially if you don’t know the caller. It is better to take a name and number and call back if you are suspicious in any way.
    - Make sure children and other family members know to be careful when answering the phone.
    - ANONYMOUS CALLS AND TELEPHONE THREATS
      * Anonymous calls and telephone threats are usually intended to lower your morale. Your natural reaction when hearing a hostile voice is one of anger/fear and to cut off the conversation. However, the caller may provide clues to their intentions or specific threats and, if possible, you should try to keep them talking:
        + Try to identify the voice by age, sex, accent, peculiarities, etc.
        + Listen for background noise, which may provide valuable information, e.g. music, machinery, animals, industrial noises, railway station sounds, etc.
        + Write down the details of the call immediately.
        + Contact the police without delay.
    1. **Institutional security**

**INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES:**

Emphasize that the most important part of security involving radical and violent extremist offenders is to follow, to the letter, normal institutional security procedures and policies. The following items are in addition to what other training has covered. Continue to have members of the class participate in reading the various items in order to keep interest and participation at a maximum.

* + - 1. Tower, Gate, Perimeter and Transportation Security Personnel – ARE POTENTIAL TERRORISTS WATCHING YOUR FACILITY OR PERSONNEL?
         1. Must watch not only visitors, inmates and vendors but also others who are outside the facility
         2. Surveillance of your facility or activities

Two unexplained/suspicious sightings

Is it a coincidence or potential problem?

Three or more suspicious/reported sightings

Assume hostile surveillance until otherwise explained

* + - * 1. Note especially, individuals taking pictures, sketching or note-taking
      1. Inmate work and recreation areas, especially if there are suspected radical and/or violent extremist offenders involved
         1. Be especially vigilant in searches of individuals, equipment, tools and products. Follow procedures without variation.
         2. Follow the tool control protocol rigidly to insure no tools or work items are taken outside of the work area.
         3. Be close enough to inmates to observe them and hear conversations, but position yourself to be prepared in case of an unprovoked attack. Remember the motivation of potential radicals and violent extremist inmates. In addition to being a potential danger to staff and other inmates if they are provoked or frightened or upset, some may institute an unprovoked attack as a part of their radical beliefs
         4. Be aware of signs indicating a possible organized attack. Changes in normal habits or dress may provide clues. Any abnormal behavior by a group of inmates should be assumed hostile until proved otherwise. Examples might be inmates wrapping their bodies with newspapers or magazines under their shirts to serve as homemade body armor or inmates who normally wear sandals in the yard switching to wearing shoes for better protection or mobility.

1. **Inmate rehabilitation and reintegration programming for radical and violent extremist offenders.**
   1. All throughout your training and orientations about our work in prisons you have heard that our job is not to punish prisoners. The punishment is the sentence. Once they come in our care we are to do all possible to insure their stay in the prison is safe and the treatment received is humane and that they are treated with respect. If you remember and practice that philosophy, then our work will aid in helping inmates self-rehabilitate and prepare to reintegrate, crime free, back into society.
   2. Where it is possible, classification and supervisory personnel will allow as much participation in prison programs for each inmate as possible. Our job, when we supervise the inmates, is to make sure they receive the same treatment as all other inmates.
   3. Even with extra observation and enforcement of security procedures, we must help encourage the inmate’s work and progress and continuously reinforce their self-confidence and feeling of self-worth.
   4. Inmates can and should feel comfortable discussing their personal problems and feelings with correctional officers. Correctional officers must never discuss their personal problems or feelings with inmates.
   5. Inmates can complain about what they see as correctional procedure, programs, personnel and operations and if we think they are valid we should talk to our supervisors to see if the situation can be improved. However, correctional officers should never complain to inmates about other staff or problems they have with correctional procedures or activities. Officer complaints should be taken up with supervisors or through existing personnel complaint procedures.
   6. If you are working with an inmate and cannot control your feelings of disdain for that person due to his/her past behavior, tell your supervisor and discuss if you should be transferred to another area or shift.
   7. If you feel you are becoming too close to an inmate and feel you might be subject to giving special favors or allowing potentially harmful behavior, tell your supervisor and discuss if you should be transferred to another area or shift.
   8. As a friend of fellow officers, if you feel one of your colleagues is exhibiting the behaviors mentioned in item f and/or g above, speak with them or with your supervisor.

CONCLUSION

Only with practice and experience will a person gain the ability to be proficient in working with inmates in a respectful and effective way. The ability to spot the danger signs of potential radicalization in an inmate is not easy nor an exact science. It takes full time observation, good listening skills, communications with fellow staff and consistent adherence to good prison practice. Review of lessons you learned in basic training, annual training and specialized courses is important. This is one function that, no matter how long a person works within a prison, there is always more to learn. AND if you suspect something but are not sure, tell your supervisors and/or members of the classification and the intelligence teams.

1. **APPENDIX**
2. **Lesson Plans from regular training that apply to radicalization and violent extremist inmates.** The lesson plans considered important to dealing with radicalized and violent extremist inmates are in **bold**.

# A SAMPLE PRISON OFFICER TRAINING COURSE

The amount of time suggested for each module is based on the experience of similar training modules as operated in several prisons in different parts of the world. The time is the **minimum** needed to cover the subject and is meant as a guide to help you develop your own module. If desired, sample lesson plans can be provided to serve as an example as individual institutions develop their own.

Though physical fitness training is important, it is not mentioned in this manual. Many prison systems bring their recruits into an academy and provide them with as much as six months to a year of basic training which has many additional elements not included here. Those who do more are to be commended and, if possible, copied by others. However, this manual is intended to present the minimum subject matter necessary for the efficient, effective and humane performance of duties. It goes without saying that without proper supervision and constant reinforcement of both the philosophy of the prison system and the appropriate behavior of the staff, the training is of little value.

Finally, what is presented here is the minimum classroom material. It is strongly suggested that the training include several practical sessions where the recruits spend time with experienced officers inside of prisons. After the initial orientation, a visit to one or more prisons is an important way to help the recruit to better understand what he or she will be exposed to during the individual lessons. It is also recommended that experienced officers be trained as "coaches" so when they are working with recruits, they can help reinforce and enhance the basic training.

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### THE FIRST WEEK -- AN OVERVIEW OF CORRECTIONS AND WORKING IN IT

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##### I. ORIENTATION

This is the student’s introduction to the corrections system. It begins with an overview of the nation’s criminal justice system and moves to the specifics of the laws covering the prison system. It ends by covering the general duties and expected behavior of prison personnel. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### II. OVERVIEW OF THE PRISON SYSTEM

This module looks at the purpose of prison within the nation. Emphasis is given to the legal difference of the status of a confinee in pre-trial detention and an offender imprisoned as a condition of the court-imposed sentence. It will also cover the different classifications of inmates which must, by law, be kept separate from each other. The final section will list and define the various prisons within the nation and describe their general purpose, population capacities and security levels. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### III. **WHO IS IN OUR PRISONS AND WHY?**

This module provides information on the race, sex, age, offense, and average term served by the nation's inmates. It also covers the types and numbers of inmates from foreign nations. The lesson ends with a discussion among the students to help identify any false stereotypes and prejudices they might have concerning inmates in general. It will include a discussion on the causes of crime, especially violent crime, within the nation. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### IV. **INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND NORMS IMPACTING ON PRISON WORK AND INMATES**

This module provides an in-depth introduction of the United Nations and other appropriate Standards and Norms defining the minimum standards of treatment required for detained and sentenced individuals. It covers inmate rights and staff responsibilities. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### V. **PRISON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES**

This module identifies the authority under which the prison system works and provides an overview of the policies. Sample policies and procedures are presented. Group discussions and exercises are conducted to enable participants to find solutions to policy questions they might encounter. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 6 hours.

##### VI. **CROSS-CULTRUAL AWARENESS**

The purpose of this module is to provide participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to supervise and effectively communicate with all members of today's culturally diverse prison community, thereby improving the overall effectiveness of prison operations and avoiding culturally related supervision problems. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### VII. **INMATE DISCIPLINE**

This module presents an introduction to the discipline process by reviewing the established rules for inmate behavior. The concept of due process in the discipline program is explained as well as punishment options. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 3 hours.

##### VIII. **INMATES AND THE PRISON ENVIRONMENT**

This module begins with a brief discussion of the impact of prison and confinement on both inmates and staff. It covers the various stages inmates go through from reception to discharge from the system. This is followed by discussions of the subtle, destructive manipulation by some inmates that can lead staff into criminal activity while working in a prison. The manipulation techniques of the criminal personality are explored as a way of developing insights to protect against the "games” that some inmates play. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### IX. **VIOLENCE IN PRISON**

This module looks at the issue of inmate violence from the point of view of controls available in prison settings. An analysis of previous disturbances or violent incidence is presented. Discussion of inmate needs and the physical conditions helping lead to prison disturbances is also provided. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 1 hour.

##### X. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRISONS AND TREATMENT PHILOSOPHIES

The previous lessons have laid the legal, operational and philosophical base of the prisons and the prison environment. This module looks at the history of how prisons developed into their current method of operating. Information is provided on the theory of re-socialization and rehabilitation and what role the prison officer plays. Current re-resocialization programs operating within the prison are explained. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hour.

##### XI. **HOSTAGE SURVIVAL**

This module answers the question, "What should I do if I were taken hostage?" Mental and emotional preparedness is stressed along with a discussion of the emergency planning that is part of the institutional response to hostage situations. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

XII. FIRE SAFETY

Fires in a prison are especially dangerous due to the security arrangements of prisons. All staff are expected to respond to fire emergencies as well as be aware of their role in fire prevention. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 1 hour.

##### XIII. **SUPERVISION OF INMATES**

This module looks at the duties, responsibilities and techniques of inmate supervision. It provides some specific supervision activities when dealing with inmates who are members of organized gangs.

### THE SECOND WEEK -- MANAGING PROBLEMS IN A PRISON SETTING

##### XIV. **INTRODUCTION TO SEARCHING TECHNIQUES**

This program is divided into sub-sections that deal with techniques for clothed body searches, unclothed body searches and cell or area searches. A consistent "head to toe" approach to the frisk search is demonstrated as one of the security skills that will be tested at the end of the week. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### XV. DRUG AWARENESS

This module introduces the drugs commonly found in prisons. It provides information on the use, effect and identification of chemicals and substances abused by inmates. It provides information concerning safety issues for staff who may come into contact with these substances. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XVI. SUICIDE PREVENTION

This module helps the staff identify the warning signs that people contemplating suicide often exhibit. Correctional Staff need to be aware of their role in identifying and preventing inmate suicide. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 1 hour.

##### XVII. **SIZING UP THE SITUATION**

This module helps the staff know what is happening in any situation. Sizing up helps avoid costly mistakes and maximizes the chances that decisions will be effective and accurate. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XVIII. **COMMUNICATING WITH INMATES**

This module provides the skills to help staff open up communications with inmates. It provides staff with the ability to get another person to tell them more about what he or she knows or thinks. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XIX. **CONTROLLING INMATE BEHAVIOR**

Besides the need to protect the due process rights of inmates, there is a need to effectively deal with inmate behavior on an on-going basis that requires good management and communication skills on the part of prison workers. This module focuses on various proven ways to effectively correct behavior. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XX. FIRST AID AND HEALTH PROMOTION

This program includes an introduction to Emergency Action Principles as well as correct procedures for patient assessment prior to rendering or summoning aid. Techniques for rescue breathing, clearing an obstructed airway, and CPR are taught as well as other procedures for emergency conditions that, if not treated, can become life threatening very quickly. The session ends with a discussion of health and disease issues, such as TB, AIDS and other communicable diseases. It also covers information on what officers can do to help promote general health and sanitary conditions within the facility. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 8 hours.

##### XXI. **NON-VIOLENT CRISIS INTERVENTION**

This module exposes the participants to recognition of the stages of crisis development in individuals as well as effective staff responses to each phase of this development. A series of exercises are provided to assist staff in experiencing what it is like to work with someone going through these phases. Participants are given exposure to non-violent defense techniques as well as a non-violent team control technique. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### XXII. **PERSONNEL PROTECTION TECHNIQUES**

This module introduces some fundamental principles of personal protection. A variety of defensive release techniques are demonstrated and practiced. The course concludes with several practical control techniques. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXIII. **KEY AND TOOL CONTROL**

The secure use of tools and keys is an important aspect of every institutional operation. Basic ideas on acquisition and control of these devices is explored and discussed. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### XXIV. **INMATE COUNTS**

This module introduces important security supervision techniques that are required in inmate management. The focus is on developing good observation skills along with procedures for conducting various types of inmate counts. An exercise in counting is a concluding activity for this module. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 1 hour.

##### XXV. **REPORT WRITING**

This module provides an introduction to basic report writing skills as a background to the legal and administrative requirements for reports of the Prison system. The program is divided into two sessions and concludes with a Practicum where each participant will complete several reports that are reviewed under the supervision of the instructor. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXVI. **STRESS MANAGEMENT**

This module demonstrates stress management techniques and has participants practice some of them. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

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### THE THIRD WEEK -- SECURITY PROCEDURE AND FIREARMS

##### XXVII. **USE OF FORCE**

This module investigates the types of force to use in controlling inmates, always keeping it to the least amount of force necessary. Practice in identifying potentially dangerous situations and how to handle them in as non-combative a manner as possible is given each participant. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXVIII. FIREARM SAFETY

This module prepares the trainees for the specific weapons they will use in corrections. The basics of weapon and range safety are carefully presented as the most important aspect of weapons handling. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 1 hour.

##### XXIX. INTRODUCTION TO WEAPONS

This module prepares the staff for the potentiality of carrying firearms and chemical agents as a job responsibility related to the authority granted them by the State. This course presents basic introductory skills and a familiarization with the handling characteristics and functional operation of each of the weapons they will use in their job. Classroom demonstration is provided for each weapon. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXX. WEAPONS – CLASSROOM PRACTICE

Each trainee is given ample time to become physically acquainted with the operation of each weapon as a prelude to range practice and qualification. A series of drills and simulations are used to develop and enhance good shooting skills prior to range use of these weapons. Special training on the handling and use of chemical agents will be covered. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXXI. RANGE PRACTICE AND QUALIFICATION

Each trainee will have an opportunity to practice with each weapon and then demonstrate a minimum of 70% proficiency with each weapon that they may be authorized to use in the course of their working duties. The courses of fire are designed to demonstrate accuracy and timeliness in weapon use. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXXII. LOW-LIGHT AND NIGHT FIRING COURSES

Firing at Dusk and during night conditions provides an important familiarization with the limitations of using a weapon in these conditions. The course of fire includes the use of all basic weapons under both low-light and full night darkness conditions. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXXIII. **USING RESTRAINING DEVICES**

The skills needed to safely and securely apply restraining devices are demonstrated in this module. The participants will learn the functional capability of restraints along with special skills used in the preparation for the transportation of prisoners. A safe transportation method is demonstrated. This is one of the security skills that will be tested at the end of the week. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 3 hours.

##### XXXIV. **TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS**

This module introduces the security problems involved in motorized transportation of prisoners. A review of common problems is presented. A variety of seating arrangement scenarios are analyzed in preparation for this portion of the security skills evaluation at the end of the week. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXXV. USE OF RADIO/TELEPHONES

This module demonstrates the different types of radio and telephone equipment used in corrections. Each trainee will be given an opportunity to practice with each type of radio. Communication security and methods of clear and concise communications are covered. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 2 hours.

##### XXXVI. **SPECIAL SECURITY ISSUES**

This module will cover specialized areas of concern to prison personnel. Those issues include:

Forced Cell Moves

Riots

Crime Scene Protection

Internal Investigations

Escapes

Attacks on the Institution by Bandits

Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

##### XXXVII. SECURITY SKILLS PRACTICE

This module allows time for controlled practice of the skills required for frisk search, restraint application and transport in one of several situations. Each trainee will work with a partner to simulate real-life situations in the use of these skills. Minimum time that should be allocated to this subject is 4 hours.

1. **Institutional Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist** (developed by the National Institute of Corrections)

**Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist: Outline**

1. **Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist**

INSTITUTION(S):

DEPARTMENT:

TEAM LEADER:

AUDIT TEAM:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. **Consideration of Terrorist Strategies**
2. Have the department and institution planned for the possibility that prisons might be targeted for a terrorist attack either because of the density of people in an isolated location or because the facility is a symbol of government control and stability?

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**NC#**

1. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorists to target an institution for mass escape, either to create panic or to demonstrate the vulnerability of government controls?

**NC#**

1. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorist groups to recruit “soldiers” from the inmate population?
2. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for an inmate strategic threat group (STG) to affiliate with a terrorist organization or to plan terrorist activity on its own?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. **Emergency System**
2. Is there policy in place that requires the department and institution to conduct an annual risk assessment?
3. Does the risk assessment specifically evaluate the risk of a terrorism emergency?

**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Has the institution completed a risk assessment in the last 12 months?
2. Does policy require that action plans be developed to mitigate deficiencies identified in the risk assessment?

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**NC#**

1. Are those action plans monitored throughout the year to determine progress and completion?

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**NC#**

1. *Emergency Policies*

**NC#**

* 1. *Command*
     1. Does policy specify who is in command in a terrorism event?

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**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* + 1. Does policy specify command and coordination with local law enforcement, the local health department, state police, the state emergency management agency, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security?

**NC#**

* + 1. Does policy specify where the command post will be situated?
    2. Does policy specify who will be allowed in the command post?

**NC#**

2. Does policy require mutual aid agreements and/or letters of understanding with outside agencies regarding counterterrorism

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**NC#**

policies and procedures?

**NC#**

1. *Notification*
   1. Does policy specify which agencies to notify during a terrorism event?

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**NC#**

* 1. Does policy specify which services/functions each external agency is expected to provide?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Do the notifications include local law enforcement?
  2. Do the notifications include the state police?

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**NC#**

* 1. Do the notifications include the state emergency management agency?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

* 1. Do the notifications include the FBI?
  2. Are telephone numbers of external agencies kept current (verified annually or more frequently)?

**NC#**

* 1. Does policy specify that emergency manuals contain contact information (business- and after-hour telephone numbers, as well as cell phone and pager numbers) for all mutual aid agencies?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. *Public Information*
   1. Does policy specify who is to speak for the department/ institution during a terrorism event?

**NC#**

* 1. Does policy specify how information will be shared with outside agencies?

**NC#**

* 1. Does policy specify “one channel out” (a single source controlled by the commander) for communicating information to the media?

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**NC#**

* 1. Does policy require mutual aid agreements and/or letters of understanding with outside agencies regarding management of public information?

**NC#**

* 1. Does policy specify where a joint public information center will be located?

1. *Training*

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**NC#**

* 1. Does policy require counterterrorism emergency exercises at least annually for the department?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Does department policy require counterterrorism emergency exercises at least annually for each institution?
  2. Does policy require a functional and/or full-scale counterterrorism exercise at least every 3 years for the department?

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**NC#**

* 1. Does policy require a functional and/or full-scale counterterrorism exercise at least every 3 years for the institution?

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**NC#**

* 1. Does policy require that outside agencies (FBI, Department of Homeland Security, state police, state emergency management agency, and local health, law enforcement, and fire departments, at a minimum) be invited to participate in counterterrorism functional or full-scale exercises?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

* 1. Does policy require evaluation of counterterrorism exercises, written identification of areas that need improvement, and monitoring of those areas?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Are all staff trained in awareness of potential terrorist threats?
  2. Are all staff trained in early detection and intervention strategies to prevent terrorist events?

**NC#**

**NC#**

* 1. Are all staff trained in specific action steps expected if a terrorist event takes place?

**NC#**

* 1. Are first responders trained specifically in precautions to take if a terrorist event is suspected?
  2. Are mailroom and warehouse staff trained in how to identify a suspicious package or substance and what to do in response?

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**NC#**

* 1. Are specialized staff trained in decontamination procedures?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Are institution staff trained in basic fire suppression (in the event that local fire agencies are not available to respond because of a community terrorism incident)?

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**NC#**

1. **Emergency Plans**
2. Does the institution have specific emergency plans for responding to a physical assault from outside the facility?

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack on the facility?

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack in the community?
2. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack on the facility?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack in the community?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a suspicious package or substance received by an individual staff member or the mailroom?

**NC#**

1. Does the institution’s emergency plan specify how to isolate and treat staff who may have been contaminated?
2. Do institution emergency plans specify how to preserve crime scenes and protect evidence?

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**NC#**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans that describe steps to take in a mass casualty emergency?

**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans that specify how daily operations will be carried out during a utility failure?
2. Do the department’s central office and the institution have plans for responding to a cyber attack?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to bomb threats?
2. Does the institution have emergency plans that specify how to respond if a bomb is found or is detonated?

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**NC#**

1. Do institution emergency plans specify where inmates and staff are to be evacuated if necessary in a terrorist attack?

\_\_\_

**NC#**

1. Do institution emergency plans specify what will be done regarding staff families in the event of a terrorist attack in the community?

**NC#**

1. Do institution emergency plans specify how to respond to an aircraft impact or vehicle impact/explosion?

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**NC#**

1. Do the central office and the institution have a plan for operating with reduced staffing levels if a terrorist attack in the community prevents staff from reporting to work?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. **Mitigation**
2. Do post orders specifically require that officers monitor the exterior of the institution to detect unusual activities?
3. Are specially selected and specially trained counterterrorism staff assigned to armed posts?

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**NC#**

1. Are food and water storage areas secured and protected from outside tampering?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Have arrangements been made for critical equipment and supplies (potable water, portable toilets, packaged meals, etc.) in the event of a terrorism incident?
2. Are deliveries closely inspected and screened before they enter the institution?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Are vendors and contractors required to submit to background checks before they enter the institution?

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**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Are blueprints/site plans signed for by the contractors and returned to the institution after projects are completed?
2. Are emergency generators and regular power and water supplies outside the perimeter secured from public access?

**NC#**

1. In an emergency, can the power plant emergency generators and water supply be operated without inmate labor?

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**NC#**

1. Are the front entrances and vehicle sally ports monitored by video cameras?

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**NC#**

1. Has the institution analyzed its vulnerability to car bombs or vehicle intrusion and erected vehicle barriers to mitigate high-risk threats?

**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have onsite explosive detection equipment?
2. Does the institution have onsite x-ray equipment?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. If the institution does not have x-ray or explosive detection equipment, does it have written agreements with outside agencies to obtain that equipment if needed?

**NC#**

1. Are National Crime Information Center (NCIC) checks conducted on all new staff?
2. Is staff parking separated from visitor parking?

**NC#**

1. Can the staff parking area be readily secured under emergency conditions?

**NC#**

1. Are procedures for high-risk inmate escort/travel orders reviewed annually?

**NC#**

1. Are visitor vehicle license plates checked at random periodically for outstanding arrest warrants?

**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Do the site plans show the institution “as built” rather than “as designed”?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Does the institution have video or photographs of each building, with indications of square footage, distances, utilities, entry/egress points, keys, phones, etc.?

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**NC#**

1. Do staff check visitor areas (including lockers) before and after each visitation period?
2. Does the institution update its staff emergency notification/information sheets at least annually and keep staff photos current?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Are staff encouraged to maintain a personal emergency preparedness checklist in their home?
2. In the event of an emergency, are utility shut-off locations available to responding police, fire, and utility company staff?

**NC#**

1. In the event of an emergency, do authorized personnel have 24-hour access to building plans?

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\_\_\_

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

AA. In the event of an emergency, are special ID cards available to expedite entry of outside emergency personnel?

**NC#**

BB. In the event of a heightened terrorism alert, are there plans for increased perimeter security patrols?

CC. In the event of a heightened terrorist alert, are there plans to provide special armament and equipment to perimeter patrol staff and traffic checkpoint staff?

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**NC#**

DD. Does equipment for these staff include rifle, shotgun, sidearm, aerosol chemical agent, flashlight, lantern, florescent vest/ jacket, protective vest, and handcuff/ flexcuffs?

**NC#**

**NC#**

EE. Are driver photographs, driver license numbers, and truck license plate numbers for regular delivery vehicles available to institution staff at extended traffic checkpoints?

**NC#**

FF. Is an area identified for offloading deliveries and supplies outside the institution’s secure perimeter, and is there a plan to use this area if necessary.

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

GG. Does the institution’s inventory of state vehicles include license plate numbers, and is it updated at least annually?

1. **Security Threat Groups (STGs)**

**NC#**

1. Is there a formalized plan to identify and monitor STGs?
2. Are all staff trained to recognize STGs through language used, signs, and tattoos?

**NC#**

1. Are possible threats by STGs regularly identified and monitored?

**NC#**

1. Do staff monitor STG recruitment activities?

**NC#**

1. Are staff aware of significant holidays observed by STGs and do they monitor activities of STG members during those times?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Are STG members denied access to certain jobs and/or areas of the institution?

**NC#**

1. Is the mailroom staff trained to monitor written materials for STG activity?
2. Is incoming mail for STG members monitored more frequently or more closely than mail for general population inmates?

**NC#**

1. Is there a reporting protocol established with the FBI and state police regarding STGs and members?

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**NC#**

1. Are STG member phone calls monitored more frequently than phone calls for the general population?

**NC#**

1. **Inmate Visitation**

**NC#**

1. Are inmate visitors checked for outstanding arrest warrants?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Are inmate visitors checked against a database of former inmates?
2. Are visitors of STG members (and/or other high-risk inmates) subjected to a higher level of screening/security checks than other inmate visitors?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Are inmate visitations randomly monitored for conversation content?
2. Are visitations of high-risk inmates monitored more frequently or more closely for conversation content than visitations of general population inmates?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. **Inmate Telephone Calls**
2. Are phone calls restricted to an approved list of individuals for each inmate?

**NC#**

1. Are individuals on inmate phone lists screened for warrants?
2. Are individuals on inmate phone lists screened against a database of former inmates?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Are individuals on high-risk inmate phone lists subjected to a higher level of security screening than individuals on general population inmate phone lists?

**NC#**

1. Is there a standard for the percentage of an inmate’s phone conversations that are monitored?

**NC#**

1. Are high-risk inmate phone conversations monitored more frequently than phone conversations of general population inmates?
2. Are all inmate phone conversations electronically recorded to provide a perpetual database of at least 10 days’ duration?

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**NC#**

1. **Inmate Mail**

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**NC#**

1. Is mail to inmates monitored for coded information or terrorist information/ activity?
2. Are publications identified that are aligned or associated with terrorist groups or activities?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Is mail for high-risk inmates subjected to a higher level of screening than mail for general population inmates?

**NC#**

1. Is there a protocol for reporting adverse or potentially dangerous terrorist information obtained from inmate mail?
2. **Specialized Equipment**

**NC#**

1. Does the institution conduct annual equipment assessments specifically to determine needs and accessibility with regard to terrorism incidents?

**NC#**

1. Is emergency equipment tested on a monthly/quarterly/annual basis, with documentation of those checks?
2. Do staff have immediate access to personal protective equipment in the event of hazardous material contamination?

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**NC#**

1. Have staff been trained in the use of this equipment?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Does the institution have bomb detection equipment or bomb-sniffing dogs available?

**NC#**

1. In the case of an explosion, is search and rescue equipment readily available to the institution?

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**NC#**

1. Does the institution have equipment and/or systems that provide communication among all key external emergency organizations?

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have an adequate supply of radios that share a frequency with local and state law enforcement and the local fire department?

**NC#**

1. **Response to a Terrorism Incident in the Community**
2. Does the institution have a plan for supplying the community with food and other provisions?

**NC#**

1. Does the institution have a plan for loaning out staff in response to a community terrorism incident?

**NC#**

* 1. Does the institution have a plan to supply medical staff/equipment to the community?

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**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Does the institution have a plan to send specialized teams such as CERT to assist in a community terrorist incident?

1. Does the institution have a plan to make inmates available to the community to assist with cleanup?

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**NC#**

1. Does the institution have a plan to make transportation available to the community if needed?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Do the institution’s emergency preparedness specialists train with the local and state emergency management agencies at least annually?

**NC#**

1. **Institutional Intelligence Function**
2. Does the institution have an identified intelligence operation?

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**NC#**

1. Does department-level policy or procedure specify coordination of institution intelligence operations?

**NC#**

1. Have staff assigned to the intelligence function received training in identifying terrorist activity and in responding to terrorist threats and incidents?

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**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. **Response to Notification of Terrorist Threats**
2. Does the institution have different levels of alert (or readiness) defined in policy?
3. Does the institution have different levels of alert (or readiness) specified in its emergency plans?

**NC#**

1. *In responding to notification of a credible and serious terrorist threat, does the institution have emergency policies that specify the following:*

**NC#**

* 1. Security for employee parking?

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**NC#**

* 1. Methods to increase screening of delivery vehicles?
  2. Methods to increase security of mail and package delivery and storage?

**NC#**

* 1. Provisions for increasing security of vehicles on grounds?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**NC#**

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Procedures for identifying/locating abandoned packages, suitcases, etc.?
  2. Procedures for verifying staff and visitor identification?

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**NC#**

* 1. A plan to reduce points of access to the institution?

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**NC#**

* 1. A plan to increase inspections of all internal and external physical premises?

**NC#**

* 1. A plan to arm (or increase the arming of) the perimeter?

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**NC#**

* 1. Provisions for erecting temporary vehicle barriers?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. Procedures for informing management staff families about receipt of suspicious packages/mail?
  2. Provisions for increasing liaison with local, state, and/or federal law enforcement?

**NC#**

**NC#**

* 1. Plans to move vehicles, crates, large trash receptacles, and other things that could conceal explosives or weapons away from buildings and critical areas?

**NC#**

* 1. Provisions for increasing external security patrols?
  2. Plans to place emergency specialists on standby?

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**NC#**

* 1. Plans to suspend inmate programs, outside work crews, onsite construction, etc.?

**NC#**

* 1. Plans to notify contractors, vendors, and/or visitors of restricted or cancelled access?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. A plan to move into hard lockdown?
  2. A plan to establish a traffic control point (or to move it farther from the institution)?

**NC#**

* 1. A plan to increase computer security?

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**NC#**

* 1. A plan to increase random security spot checks of vehicles, visitors, packages, staff, etc.?

**NC#**

* 1. A plan to notify staff and staff families of higher alert levels to reduce rumors and family anxiety?

**NC#**

* 1. A plan to add security for and decrease access to critical resource areas?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

* 1. A plan to discontinue all inmate transfers in/out and to transport inmates to community hospitals and courts only in emergency situations?

D. Is there a protocol established for reporting relevant terrorist information to the state police and FBI?

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**NC#**

1. **Response to Cyber Attack**

**NC#**

1. Have the institution and the department’s central office analyzed vulnerabilities

to cyber attack?

1. Have the institution and the central office identified crucial records and crucial databases?

**NC#**

1. Have the institution and the central office designated “hot sites” (locations with an operating computer system that can accept and maintain software and/or database information from a disabled site) distant from their own locations?

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**NC#**

**NC#**

1. Are all crucial databases and records within the department backed up offsite?

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**Criterion Comments**

**Status**

**Method**

1. Are there detailed plans for data recovery?
2. Are there detailed plans for operating with primary servers, databases, and programs disabled?

**NC#**

**NC#**

**Status: MC** – Meets Criterion; **PM** – Partially Met; **NM** – Not Met; **NA** – Not Applicable.

**Evaluation Methodology: OB** – Observed; **DR** – Document Review; **SI** – Staff Interview; **II** – Inmate Interview; **OT** – Other (specify).

**NC# Boxes:** See instruction 13.

AUDITOR:

DATE:

**SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS**

**Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist**

AUDITOR:

PAGE OF

DATE:

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| **NC #** | **Item Description** | **Reason for Noncompliance** | **Assigned To** | **Due Date** | **Apprvd By** | **Apprval Date** |
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| **Status:** |
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| **Method:** |

**Review of all items on this page completed: Yes**

**No**

NAME:

SIGNATURE:

DATE:

1. The Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), Kings College, London, UK [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. John Horgan, ‘Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis’ in Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (eds.), *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (London and New York: Routledge 2009), p. 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. ‘Political Crime and Political Offender: Theory and Practice’, *Liverpool Law Review, 8(1) (1986).* [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. <http://www.mesacc.edu/dept/d46/psy/dev/Fall01/terrorism/motivation.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)